Recently, an important resolution was discussed at the UN General Assembly. This resolution presents responses to various issues in the international community and has drawn attention. There were diverse opinions and discussions among countries, highlighting several contentious points.
Notably, subjects such as environment, human rights, and peacekeeping emerged as major agenda, attracting significant interest from many. If this resolution is adopted, it is expected to have a positive impact on countries around the world.
Therefore, it is necessary to closely monitor the forthcoming situation. This could be an important turning point in leading changes in the international community.
The decision on disarmament by Ukraine and the associated regrets have garnered much attention. A significant incident related to this was the Budapest Memorandum signed by Ukraine with the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom in 1994. Through this treaty, Ukraine received guarantees to have its territories safely protected in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons, along with a promise that Russia would refrain from using military force.
However, these assurances and promises proved limited in actually ensuring Ukraine's security, leaving many to point out that this decision has resulted in deep regrets. The belief that there would be a reliable support system led to overlooking the realistic dangers faced by Ukraine, which has now made the current situation more regrettable.
The concept of political promises can be found in Assurance. This Assurance generally appears in the form of memoranda or agreements and possesses a declarative characteristic without legal binding effects. Therefore, even if this promise is violated, one can morally condemn or exert political pressure on the opposing country, but does not bear legal responsibility.
However, Guarantee is different. There is a clear legal binding difference between Guarantee and Assurance in international treaties. A Guarantee is recognized as an official treaty under international law, and the states that sign it bear legal obligations. For example, the collective defense clause, which considers an attack on one NATO member as an attack on all, is an example of a Guarantee.
Violating a Guarantee can label a state as untrustworthy in the international community, thereby increasing the likelihood of adherence to such agreements. In this context, Ukraine regrets not being able to expect a proper Guarantee since the Budapest Memorandum was declared a mere Assurance.
Ultimately, understanding the nature of such promises in international relations is crucial. Assurance is merely a political commitment, whereas Guarantee is an official treaty with legal binding effects, so it is vital to clearly recognize the difference between them.
The Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, through ratification by the U.S. Senate, holds equivalent legal force to U.S. domestic law and provides strong protection for Korea. Article 3 of this treaty states that the U.S. will regard an attack on Korea as an attack on itself, thereby establishing a basis for Korea to receive military support from the U.S.
However, this principle of mutual defense also entails conflicting responsibilities. In other words, if the U.S. is attacked, Korea is also obligated to perceive it as an attack on itself and respond accordingly.
Similarly, Taiwan has experienced being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella through a mutual defense treaty signed in 1954. Thus, military alliances in international relations serve as crucial elements that clearly outline mutual obligations and responsibilities.
While Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty with the U.S., it could not rely solely on the U.S. This is because, in 1964, when China joined the nuclear club as the fifth nation in the world, the military balance between the two countries drastically shifted. Mao Zedong pushed forward with a military strategy known as the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" plan. In this plan, 'Two Bombs' referred to the atomic and hydrogen bombs, while 'One Satellite' referred to a single artificial satellite. In fact, on October 16, 1964, China successfully conducted a nuclear test in the Xinjiang Uyghur region, demonstrating visible results of this plan.
After witnessing Japan's surrender due to two atomic bombs in 1945, Taiwan's leader Chiang Kai-shek sent three physicists to the U.S. to request research on nuclear technology. However, after losing to the Communist Party of China in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, he relocated to Taiwan, causing Chiang's nuclear bomb development plans to come to a halt. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong completed China's nuclear armament amidst Taiwan's halt in nuclear armament.
Chiang Kai-shek consequently initiated a new project known as the "Hsinchu Plan," taking inspiration from Israel's nuclear development model. The Hsinchu Plan was named after a research team established at Tsinghua University in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Tsinghua University had a research reactor imported from the U.S., forming the basis for nuclear weapons development. Israel, in the late 1950s, succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons by introducing French nuclear technology under the “Dimona Plan”.
Taiwan managed to recruit Dr. David Bergman, who had led Israel's nuclear development efforts, as an advisor. This Hsinchu Plan became a nuclear armament policy that garnered some consensus across party lines in Taiwan. However, when the opposition party resisted, citing American backlash, economic burdens, and limited territory, Chiang Kai-shek ultimately decided to cancel the Hsinchu Plan.
Chiang Kai-shek turned the Hsinchu Plan into the more secretive "Taoyuan Plan." The Taoyuan Plan was named after Taoyuan County outside Taipei City in Taiwan. This area hosted a scientific research institute directly under the Ministry of National Defense, and Chiang Kai-shek subsequently expanded this institute into the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. After announcing its development of weapons for fighter jets, missiles, electronic warfare, and chemical warfare, the Chungshan Institute embarked on nuclear weapons development.
In the process, uranium was successfully procured from South Africa while avoiding U.S. surveillance. These series of events significantly contributed to strengthening Taiwan's military independence and sovereignty, profoundly impacting regional security.
By securing nuclear-related resources and equipment from Canada, Taiwan began laying the groundwork for nuclear weapons development. Specifically, in the southeastern Pingtung County, underground nuclear testing facilities were created under the Jioufeng base, facilitating smooth research and development.
In 1975, historical figure Chiang Kai-shek passed away, but his son Chiang Ching-kuo continued to pursue the nuclear armament policy his father had initiated. In 1979, diplomatic relations were established between China's Deng Xiaoping and the U.S. However, as a result, the U.S. accepted the "One China" principle advocated by Deng Xiaoping.
Ultimately, the U.S. severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan and abolished the nuclear umbrella and mutual defense treaty it had previously guaranteed to Taiwan. Instead, it agreed to provide Taiwan with six guarantees agreed upon with China, leading to significant changes in Taiwan's weapons development and diplomatic stance.
In increasingly desperate circumstances, Taiwan began accelerating its nuclear development. In 1980, Taiwan successfully secured enriched uranium technology, indicating that their military ambitions had grown. The then Chief of Staff of the Taiwan military and Director of the Chungshan Institute, Hsiao Po-chun, mentioned in his memoirs that by 1986, they had succeeded in acquiring the technology to produce nuclear weapons.
The U.S. undertook several measures regarding Taiwan, expressing its intention to supply weapons to Taiwan, stating that it would not consult with China in advance. Additionally, it maintained an unofficial relationship with Taiwan and committed not to obstruct Taiwan's entry into international organizations. The U.S. also established a policy of not acting as a mediator between Taiwan and China, ensuring that Taiwan would not be forced into negotiations with China. Although there was support from the U.S., Taiwan recognized that it could not expect solid protection.
Consequently, even with the supply of weapons and diplomatic support, Taiwan felt a necessity to supplement its inadequate delivery systems—namely missiles and aircraft—to secure stronger defenses. These efforts were essential for the safety of the nation, reinforcing the emphasis on their military independence.
In the 1970s and 80s, nuclear physicist Ho Liwei, who participated in nuclear weapons development at the Chungshan Institute, published a book titled "MIT." In this book, it was mentioned that the manufacturing of nuclear weapons was nearly complete, and that once a decision was made, they could produce a nuclear bomb within a short time.
Interestingly, the name "MIT" is derived from the initial letters of "Made in Taiwan," not from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. However, despite having the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, a lack of actual launch methods left them in a state of internal despair, which is reflected in the book. Such statements highlight the reality that they were left with no choice but to utilize nuclear weapons solely for self-destruction.
Under the leadership of Ho Liwei at the Chungshan Institute, there was a Deputy Director named Chang Hsien. After majoring in physics and receiving a government scholarship, he obtained master's and doctoral degrees in nuclear engineering from the University of Tennessee in the U.S. Upon returning to Taiwan, he joined the nuclear weapons development project as a colonel in the military.
However, on January 9, 1988, Chang Hsien made the decision to escape by boarding a U.S. special plane with his family at Ching Chuan Kang Airport. On January 12, he delivered important testimony exposing Taiwan's nuclear weapons development plans before the U.S. Congress. His statements in Congress had a significant impact on the Taiwanese government, and the U.S. began to exert strong pressure on Taiwan. They demanded the immediate cessation of nuclear development plans and the dismantling of nuclear facilities. This was intended to maintain credibility in relations with Taiwan.
The day after Chang Hsien's testimony, on January 13, Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, suddenly passed away from a heart attack. It is said that the stress from Chang Hsien's exposure, combined with his ongoing battle with severe diabetes, contributed to his death. Consequently, according to the constitution, Li Deng-hui was appointed as acting president, but he lacked political power and a support base.
Ultimately, Li Deng-hui could not withstand U.S. pressure and accepted an audit by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leading to the decision to halt nuclear development. On January 15, the IAEA began special nuclear inspections in Taiwan, and all related facilities were closed. This marked a significant turning point in Taiwan's nuclear development history and had a major impact on the international community. These events held immense significance not only for Taiwan's political circumstances but also for international nuclear safety issues.
The central figure in the covert story related to Taiwan's nuclear development, Chang Hsien, is said to have obtained a doctorate in nuclear energy from the University of Tennessee in the U.S. Afterward, he reportedly joined the CIA, providing Taiwan's nuclear development information actively at the Chungshan Institute for 20 years under the CIA's instruction. In this process, Taiwan believed that their nuclear development was conducted with utmost secrecy, while in actuality, it was manipulated by the U.S.
In Taiwan's case, it can be seen as a result of failing to properly utilize their talents. In contrast, Ukraine is evaluated as having made mistakes regarding contracts.
Meanwhile, in situations where contracts are critical for problem-solving, no one pays attention when things go smoothly, but when difficulties arise, there is a tendency to revisit the contract to find ways to shift blame onto the other party. In reality, words or promises often lose their meaning as time passes or problems arise. While individuals with character flaws can improve and collaborate, one must recognize that working with untrustworthy parties carries significant risks.
